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PREFACE 
The intermarket price differentials between July wheat futures 
contracts on the Chicago and Kansas City Boards of Trade are investi-
gated in this study. Determining the factors which are associated 
with changes in the intermarket price difference is the principal 
objective. Data concerning commitments of traders in commodity futures 
and several selected price series are used to explain the price dif-
ferential. Weekly futures quotes from the Chicago and Kansas City 
Boards of Trade are analyzed using simple linear regression techniques. 
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There are many years when the wheat price has changed only twenty 
cents over the entire crop year. Two recent examples are the 1968 and 
1970 crop years. However, the situation of extremely stable wheat prices 
eroded as huge government stockpiles of wheat diminished in the early 
1970's. As wheat stocks dwindled, the lid on price came off. Farmers 
thus lost the price stability and production controls that had made 
marketing strategies and planning nearly obsolete. Traditionally most 
producers had sold the crop as it was harvested. There was little 
incentive to do otherwise. After the end of harvest, wheat prices 
typically would increase, reflecting storage costs, and then begin to 
decrease with the approach of the next harvest. A farmer who employed 
more involved marketing strategies seldom reaped a premium for his 
efforts. 
Problem Setting. 
The scene changed rapidly in the 1972 crop marketing year. As the 
price of wheat increased dramatically, so did its volatilivy. Table I 
shows the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of the 
cash wheat price series at the Gulf over the 1971 crop year to be 3.52 
and 2.04 respectively. The standard deviation of that same series 














MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND COEFFICIENT OF 
VARIATlON OF THE GULF WHEAT PRICES, CROP 
YEARS 1965-66 THROUGH 1973-74 
Coefficient 
Standard of 
Mean Deviation Variation 
184.90 11.04 5.97 
198.67 10.07 5.07 
172.33 8.73 5.06 
152.63 4. 77 3.12 
154. 76 5.48 3.52 
171 . 98 4.55 2. 77 
173 .·02 3.52 2.04 
264.63 31. 32 11.84 
494.48 67.66 13.68 
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variation increased to 11.84. The increase was even more striking the 
next year as the measures of variation advnaced to 67.66 and 13.68 
respectively. When the price of wheat tripled in two years as prices 
wildly fluctuated, it is of little wonder that there has been so much 
more emphasis on several different forms of marketing wheat. 
Many managers faced with high price volatility have turned to 
forward contracting to alleviate some of the risk. There are several 
methods of. forward contracting, and hedging on the futures market can 
perform this role. 1 As the debt load carried by farmers continues 
to increase, the relative security of hedging would seem desirable to 
both the farmer and his creditors. If the wheat producer chooses to 
use the futures market, there are five different contract months on 
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four separate exchanges from which to choose. The primary emphasis of 
this study will be on Oklahoma producers and the opportunities open to 
them in choosing among the commodity exchanges that will accept delivery 
of hard red winter wheat against their futures contract. Both the 
Kansas City and Chicago Boards of Trade accept delivery of hard red 
winter wheat and the price differentials between these two markets will 
be the center of analysis in this study. 
One problem facing producers is the selection of the exchange to 
be used for placing a hedge. Paul, Heifner and Helmuth [15] stated 
that generally the futures contract should be sold with a par delivery 
point closest to the cash market where the commodity will be sold. 
They further state that the first exchange to consider for hard red 
winter wheat is the Kansas City Board of Trade. This is certainly 
correct. They did not explain, however, that there are instances when 
it would be most advantageous to use the Chicago Board of Trade to 
place the hedge instead of the Kansas City Board of Trade. That was 
not the main extent of their paper. The futures quotes of the Chicago 
and Kansas City Boards of Trade are seldom identical and their differ-
ence is protean. At times the Chicago futures quote can be 10 to 15 
cents above the Kansas City quote and at other times the inverse is 
true. An extreme case in point would be the 1972 crop year. Early 
in the crop year the Kansas City futures quote was 6.375 cents above 
the Chicago futures quote, but toward the end of the crop year the 
Kansas City quote was 24.25 cents under Chicago. This move of 30.625 
cents is the amount that could have been made or lost by choosing to 
deal on the Chicago Board of Trade rather than the Kansas City Board 
of Trade. The relationships change from year to year. The very next 
year the short hedger could have earned 15 to 20 cents by hedging in 
September or October at Chicago instead of on the Kansas City Board 
of Trade and removing the hedge in May or early June. Thus a correct 
decision by the producer as to whether or not to place a hedge on a 
particular market can be as important as the decision to hedge. 
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Objectives 
In reaction to increased price variability in recent years, many 
producers are attempting to reduce the risk of severe price changes by 
hedging on an organized commodity futures exchange. As the number of 
farmers using futures markets increase, more information needs to be 
available concerning the different markets with which to hedge and 
what factors affect the differences between the markets. 
This study involves an analysis of how the intermarket price 
differentials between Kansas City and Chicago move and what major 
factors affect such movements. Immediately several questions come 
to mind. What is the direction of influence caused by each of the 
factors which significantly affects the spread? Are there certain 
"limits" which the intermarket price differential cannot exceed? Does 
the price differential move more freely in one direction than the 
other? It is in an effort to shed some light,on these questions that 
this study was undertaken. 
The primary objective of this study is to isolate and analyze the 
factors which are associated with changes in the intermarket price 
differentials between the Kansas City and Chicago Boards of Trade. If 
these factors and their effects can be detennined, wheat producers and 
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marketing firms could use the markets with more success in establishing 
future sales prices or in shifting risk of price changes associated 
with inventory earnings. Several divisions of the primary objective 
will be considered in the study and are as follows: 
1) Determine the variables which have had a significant influence 
on the intennarket price differentials. 
2) Analyze the consistency of effects of variables over time. 
3) Separate the overall time period into several smaller time 
frames that are characterized by conditions existing during 
the period. Report changes in significant variables believed 
to be due to conditions existing during that period. 
4) Construct models useful in the selection of which futures 
market to use for hedging or forward pricing under alterna-
tive sets of circumstances. 
Linear regression techniques and weekly futures quotes from the 
Chicago and Kansas City Boards of Trade between 1965 and 1974 are the 
primary techniques and data used in the analysis. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Allen B. Paul, Ricahrd G. Heifner and John W. Helmuth, Farmers' 
Use of Forward Contracts and Futures Markets, United States Department 
of Agriculture, Economic Research Service Agricultural Economic Report 
No. 320 (Washington, 1976). The authors present and explain many types 
of forward contracts including the use of futures markets. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
There are numerous studies available that are concerned with 
defining the major variables that influence the futures price of 
various commodities on different commodity exchanges. However, only a 
few dwell on the more precise topic of the relative price difference 
between exchanges. Most all books written about futures markets and 
commodity trading have a short section that discusses 11 spreading 11 
either contract months or crop years, on a certain exchange. Some of 
these books continue by exploring 11 intermarket spreading", but most 
merely acknowledge its existence and offer no analysis, quantitative 
or otherwise. 
lntermarket Price Differentials for Wheat 
An article by Fredrick Clifton [2] is one exception to the afore-
mentioned case. Clifton's article analyzes the price differentials 
arising from spreads among the Chicago Board of Trade, the Kansas 
City Board of Trade and the Minneapolis Grain Exchange. The 1965 study 
outlined the b&sic factors that he felt.accounted for the market 
differences. One of the major influences was government policy. 
Differing support and loan prices for the three main types of wheat 
(hard red winter, soft red winter and hard red spring for this study) 
were quite important. Of greater importance were the government 
7 
8 
stocks of wheat. Although the government did not control much soft 
red wheat it was certainly an important price maker. The government's 
influence on "free" carryover and supplies was a factor influencing the 
spreads. 
Other variables were outlined in the study, some of which could 
have current importance. Clifton stated that supply and demand forces 
for each class of wheat could bring about changes in the spreads 
nearly to the approximate freight differences before wheat would be 
moved from one terminal to another. He also noted that the Minneapolis 
and Kansas City futures contracts can only be fi 11 ed by spring wheat 
and hard red winter wheat respectively. Thus, conceivably these 
markets could "run away". 
Clifton mentioned several other factors he felt influenced the 
intermarket spread. These included size, type and location of the 
three wheats concerned, along with the shipping costs from one market 
to the other. 
Gray [8], in a 1961 study, analyzed the relationship among three 
futures markets for wheat. Gray explained that all futures markets 
depend upon hedging for their existence, but the relative amounts of 
hedging vary from market to market. He stated that most hedgers in 
wheat futures would prefer to hedge on either the Kansas City or 
Minneapolis markets rather than Chicago so as to get a 11 closer 11 hedge. 
The hedge is "closer" in a geographical sense in that elevators and 
milling firms are more heavily concentrated in areas around Kansas 
City and Minneapolis than around Chicago. The hedge is also "closer" 
in that the smaller market's futures contracts require a certain class 
of wheat be delivered, which more nearly fills the needs of most hedgers. 
· In contrast the Chi ca go market 1 s contract will accept delivery of 
various classes of wheat. 
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Gray then used the idea of hedgers preference of the smaller 
markets and much higher speculation at Chicago relative to the other 
markets and set up a simple framework for discussion. He suggested 
looking at the three markets assuming that Kansas City and Minneapolis 
were preferred by all hedgers and Chicago had all of the speculation. 
All matched hedging would go to the two smaller markets and all 
unmatched hedging would go to Chicago where it would be matched by 
speculation .. Any additional speculation would be carried on in Chicago. 
Gray hypothesized that if changes in the level of reported hedging 
were observed, open interest would change between Chicago and the 
smaller markets such that matched hedging would help business in the 
smaller markets and unmatched hedging would help business in Chicago. 
Gray found that price disparities would show up when unmatched 
hedging began to build up at Kansas City or Minneapolis. When prices 
on the smaller exchanges are out of line with Chicago, hedgers tend 
to go directly to Chicago with their business, perhaps hoping to replace 
the hedge at the smaller market should the opportunity arise. This 
continuous survei 11 ance tends to keep i ntermarket price differenti a 1 s 
in line with what the trade feels are comparative values. Spreaders 
provide a link for speculation to flow from one market to the other 
when speculation on smaller markets is inadequate. However, Gray felt 
that hedgers were not willing to pay spreaders large profits in order 
to achieve a 11 closer 11 hedge. Beyond a certain point all unmatched 
hedging tends to go directly to Chicago. Gray stated it was clear that 
the level of unmatched hedging determined the amount of business at 
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Chicago and the level of matched hedging determined the amount of busi-
ness in the smaller markets. Despite hedger's preference for the 
small er markets, Gray felt that most hedging goes to Chicago because 
that market has a high price elasticity of demand for futures contracts. 
Stated differently, there is ample speculation to absorb the hedging. 
Intennarket Price Differentials for 
Other Conmodities 
In a 1964 study, Toulemendale [20] analyzed intermarket price 
differentials among the London, Sydney and New York wool futures 
markets. The.markets in New York and Sydney deal in the raw form of 
wool known as "grease wool". The London market deals in semiprocessed 
form of wool referred to as "wool tops". Toulemendale attempted to 
offer empirical evidence in support of a theory presented by Cootner 
[3] which suggested that in the case of commodities that were harvested, 
futures prices should rise after the peak of hedging has passed. This 
theory was proposed by Cootner as an alternative to the theory of 
"normal bac;kwardation". Cootner felt that if inventories were low, 
hedging may be net long as an offset to forward contracts to deliver 
and speculators may be short. Under those conditions Cootner suggested 
that prices would have to fall if speculators were to make money. 
Though the sample period was very short, Toulemendale found an average 
profit per transaction using a trading scheme developed along the 
lines of Cootner's theory. Toulemendale's hypothesis was that from 
July l to December l, the New York futures would gain relative to 
Sydney and London. Conversely he expected the reverse would occur 
from December l to July 1 . 
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Speculation and Hedging 
In a 1960 study Holbrook Working [27] put forth statistical evi-
dence refuting the long hel'd belief that futures markets are primarily 
speculative markets. He did so by showing that the amount of specula-
tion, measured in dollar value of open speculative contracts, has 
differed greatly between commodities. Some commodities were found to 
have ten, twenty or even several hundred times as much speculation as 
others. The differences in the amount of speculation were basically 
dependent upon the level of hedging in the markets. A close corres-
pondence was shown between changes in the respective levels of specula-
tion and hedging. His analysis led him to the conclusion that 
speculation in all futures markets is primarily dependent upon the 
amount of hedging in that market. He further concluded that no market 
can exist without a sufficient level of hedging for support. 
In a ~ore recent study Gray [7] found that between two markets of 
equal stature and similar composition he would expect 11 net 11 iritermarket 
spreading to vary randomly over a long time period and not be signifi-
cantly different from zero on an average. He felt that the relative 
thinness of the Kansas City market in relation to Chicago would not 
change this a priori expectation but the fact that Kansas City has a 
much higher proportion of hedging than Chicago, and Chicago a much 
larger proportion of speculation in its open interest, would introduce 
factors suggestive of price-bias. Gray pointed out that in some years 
there is so much short hedging at Kansas City as to strain the market 
because of a lack of long hedging. When this situation is reversed 
it becomes a more delicate situation because what little speculation 
there is at Kansas City is not responsive to these hedging needs. 
Thus Gray notes that intermarket spreading is in effect a transfusion 
of speculation. The price effects of speculation inadequacy are 
implicit, Gray contends. The full price effect, which must be very 
substantial, would be that of all the hedging in Kans1as City which 
goes to Chicago because of its greater hedging capacity. 
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Cootner [4] felt that a sufficient condition for the payment of 
risk premiums by hedgers as a group was that the price of a futures 
contract rise monotonically from the time that net short hedging first 
occurred to the time when it first became zero "and" the price decline 
monotonically from the moment net long hedging begins to the time it 
becomes zero. Cootner emphasized that this was clearly not a necessary 
condition. 
In re 1 a ti on to the above statement Cootner hypothesized that prices 
of wheat futures contracts should rise and fall, on the average, during 
times of net short and net long hedging respectively. One problem in 
the 1967 study was that data were available only for a short period. 
Because of the lack of data Cootner used supply data as a proxy for 
hedging data. He felt that when supplies peaked it would be safe to 
assume that hedging was net short. Long hedging was then assumed to 
rise from some fixed data in the spring. 
CHAPTER III 
FUTURES MARKETS AND PRICE DISCOVERY 
Determination and Discovery of Prices 
Intersection of market supply and market demand curves determine 
price in the perfectly competitive market. This equilibrium price is 
the price at which the market will clear. No seller will be willing 
to accept less than the equilibrium price and no buyer will pay more, 
all else constant. One major assumption underlying this equilibrium 
is that of perfect knowledge. Percect knowledge means that all parti-
cipants involved in the marketing of this commodity have total, complete 
and exact information concerning all things past, present and future. 
A contrast can be made between this theoretical model and the real 
world. In the actual marketing of a commodity there is not perfect 
knowledge of supply and demand conditions etc. Knowledge of the 
relevant factors affecting supply and demand are usually estimated at 
various intervals before they a re known with certainty. Available 
(imperfect) knowledge is used by the many participants involved in the 
market to help to 11 discover 11 price. That is, price is "determined 11 
by the interaction of supply and demand forces in the theoretical 
model but price must be 11 discovered 11 by the informed market partici-
pants. The buyers and sellers in the real world markets do not have 
the advantage of having perfect knowledge concerning all relevant 
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variables. They must then use available information and attempt to 
seek out the market clearing price through buying and selling activities. 
This process of price discovery is, in effect, the process of price 
forecasting. 
The price discovery process is reflected in futures market prices. 
For example, consider the July futures contract for wheat. This is the 
first contract in the "new" crop year for wheat. In August the July 
futures quote should reflect the composite consensuses of traders as to 
what the price of wheat will be the following July. However the informa-
tion that is available concerning the coming crop at that point in time 
is at best quite limited. Only expectations are available since no 
significant portion of the crop has been planted. Other factors such 
as weather and the amount of wheat grazed out can change the total 
production substantially. During the following months the information 
begins to improve. In December the United States Department of Agri-
culture issues the first official estimate of winter wheat production. 
In addition by December, processors, exporters, etc. have better ideas 
of the total demand for the crop. In theory the trader in the futures 
market determines what is believed to be the "correct" price for the 
commodity during the delivery months on the basis of existing informa-
tion. If the current futures quote is above the traders expected 
price he will sell a quantity of futures contracts expecting to buy 
them back when the expected price is achieved. If the trader's judg-
ment is correct he receives a profit of the difference between the two 
prices. This profit would be equal to the losses of the trader's whose 
judgment was incorrect. Therefore the collective actions of traders 
lead to the establishment of the "correct" price. 
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With each bit of new information, the market price is adjusted. 
There is, therefore, a continual balancing of the judgments of traders 
who believe that the current price is higher or lower than the price 
will be in the final analysis. As the information improves and the 
crop approaches harvest there is less and less uncertainty associated 
with the supply and demand factors. Finally the market price will be 
discovered when the contract matures and all the relevant information 
is known. 
This analysis does, however, point up one problem. A futures 
contract has only one price at a given point in time. However, several 
different grades of wheat are deliverable on most futures contracts and 
some contracts allow for delivery of several classes of wheat. If a 
futures market is to serve as a reliable means of price discovery, 
the price of the futures contract must be related to one set of quality 
characteristics. It would be quite difficult to insure that a delivered 
price referred to a constant set of quality standards for only one 
class of wheat since wheat quality differs substantially among lots 
and even within individual lots. Commodity Exchanges have a set of 
premiums and discounts that are used if the quality or class of wheat 
delivered deviates from the one preferred for delivery. These premiums 
and discounts are generally set up to encourage delivery of the quality 
of commodity desired such as No. 2 hard red winter wheat. That is if 
the cash market normally pays a six cent per bushel premium for No. 
wheat the futures contract might only offer four cents premium over 
No. 2 wheat. Through this mechanism a futures ;price tends to reflect 
the price of a commodity meeting certain quality characteristics. 
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Hedgers of a co111T10dity buy and sell futures as a hedge against cash 
transactions. Through this action the hedger transfers some of the risk 
of a major price change to another participant in the market. Therefore 
the hedger reduces the possibility of obtaining windfall profits from a 
substantial price change but the possibility of incurring monumental 
losses has also been reduced. Hedgers may take positions in the futures 
mark.et because of price expectations or in an attempt to remain 
completely hedged while their cash inventory is changing. Generally 
the other side of the hedge transaction is taken by a speculator who 
has anticipated receiving a favorable price change that will reap him 
profits. Thus futures markets combine the effects of price discovery, 
hedging and speculation with different emphasis at different times. 
Theories of Changes in Futures Prices 
There are several theories concerning the behavior of futures 
prices. Two of the more commonly held and widely discussed theories 
will be presented in the following segments. 
Keynes-Hicks Hypothesis 
Keynes [11] and Hicks [10] advanced one of the early hypotheses 
concerning the movement of futures prices. They viewed futures prices 
as downward biased estimates of expected spot prices. Their hypothesis 
is referred to as the theory of "normal backwardation". It is based 
on the idea that holders of the cash commodity can hedge themselves 
against price risk by the sale of futures contracts. Keynes and Hicks 
believed that since this was a valuable service to hedgers they were 
willing to pay others (speculators) to take long positions in the 
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futures market thus bearing the risk of a change in price. It is 
evident that this hypothesis is founded on several premises. First 
and of major importance is that no forward market can exist without 
speculators, who will be net long, to accept the risk of a change in 
price. In addition these speculators are expected to be willing to 
buy futures contracts only if the futures price is below the expected 
cash price. Finally, hedgers are viewed as only interested in the 
futures market for the purpose of transferring risk. Thus speculators 
must make a profit or they will not engage in assuming the risk of a 
price change. 
Under the theory of "normal backwardation 11 hedgers would expect 
to pay a risk premium for the protection they seek. This concept is 
similar to the payment of insurance premiums where the person desiring 
insurance must pay a small sum to be insured against the possibi1ity 
of a large loss. The cost of the insurance increases as the possi-
bility of a loss increases. 
Keynes and Hicks concluded that speculators, as a group, should be 
making money through their risk-taking activities on the futures market. 
Thus an upward trend would be a normal characteristic of all futures 
markets. To test this hypothesis an upward trend of price during the 
contract year should be evident, especially as the delivery date 
approaches. If this trend exists it would imply that the level of 
futures contract prices is not a reliable estimate of the expected 
cash price. This theory has been widely discussed but current evidence 
tends not to support it. Working {28), Telser [17) and Gray [9] all 
have tested the hypothesis for harvest conmodities and found that there 
is no tendency for futures prices to rise over the calendar year as a whole. 
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Random Walk Hypothesis 
The random walk hypothesis was suggested by Holbrook Working (29) 
as early as 1949. He noted that time series. data often possess 
characteristics similar to those of cumulated random numbers. The 
separate items of time series are by no mean random but changes between 
successive items tend to be largely random. The hypothesis came about 
as a result of studies into why futures prices seem to exhibit different 
responses at different points in time when economic factors appear to 
be consistent at these points in time. In addition the Hicks-Keynes 
hypothesis did not explain changes in futures prices. These points 
lead to the idea that price changes were caused, to a great extent, by 
pure random variation. 
The random walk theory suggests that successive price changes in 
markets such as futures markets are independent and thus past history 
of a series generates no infonnation that would be useful in predicting 
future price changes. For the random walk theory to hold, the market 
under consideration shoul'd be an 11efficient11 market. A market would 
be regarded as efficient if the market price was, at all times, the 
consensus of a large group of equally well informed individual traders, 
each attempting to maximize profits. In a theoretical market such as 
this, the price at any given time would represent all available 
information. This price would also reflect information concerning 
futures events (even though this knowledge is imperfect). According 
to the random walk hypothesis differences of opinion concerning the 
validity of the imperfect knowledge causes actual pri~es to move 
randomly about the "efficient market price". In addition, efficient 
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market futures prices change in response to new information which is 
itself random. In this type of theoretical market a trader would be 
successful only if he were more adept at decoding currently available 
information than the average trader. In theory the futures market 
would make the process of price discovery more 11 efficient11 through 
more accurate price forecasts. Thus futures markets should implicitly 
provide a larger quantity of widely dispersed and readily available 
information to all persons involved in the marketing of the commodity. 
This suggests that a small er degree of unwarranted price variation 
might be expected in the 'presence of a future market for the commodity, 
all other things equal. 
Random walk does provide an explanation of erratic changes in 
futures prices but does not explain the existence of trends in futures 
prices. Trends which occur infrequantly would not be inconsistent 
with the idea that futures prices represent the best available esti~ 
mate of the price on the delivery date. Thus the random walk hypothesis 
does not disallow the existence of trend~ in a price series but the 
hypothesis would be invalid if consistent and regular trends were 
observable. 
CHAPTER 1V 
PRICE DISCOVERY FOR HARD RED WINTER WHEAT 
Aggregate Demand 
The price of wheat is determined by supply and demand forces. 
The demand for wheat can be broken down into two broad categories, 
domestic demand and export demand. Domestic demand is made up of 
wheat used in the United States for food, feed, seed and in industrial 
uses. The export demand category is comprised of commercial exports 
and government program exports. 
Domestic Demand 
Food demand usually is the larger of the four domestic uses. 
Flour demand is the largest component of food demand, accounting for 
about 75 percent of the total. The major components of the non-food 
demand for wheat are wheat used in animal feed and wheat used for seed. 
An additional but much smaller segment of the non-food demand for 
wheat is the use of grain in industrial uses, primarily in the 
preparation of distilled spirits. 
Most of the United States population consumes wheat in some form. 
Because of this trait the demand for wheat is ubiquitous and the 
areas of greatest population density will be the areas of greatest 




Domestic consumption of wheat has been extremely stable over the 
past few years. This stability has come about primarily because of 
the interaction of two factors. The decreasing per capita consumption 
of wheat has been mostly offset by increasing population levels. The 
non-food uses of wheat typically have been the areas that have caused 
the greatest variance in domestic use. When wheat prices get low 
enough relative to corn or other feed grains, wheat enters into 
competition as a feed ingredient. Large changes in the amount of 
wheat fed will cause shifts in the total domestic use. 
Export Demand 
The export demand for wheat is extremely important as a component 
of the total demand for wheat. For several years prior to the 1972-73 
crop marketing year exports had been relatively stable. However, 
because of policy changes in some foreign governments and poor crops 
in several areas, exports began to increase in the 1972-73 crop year. 
Thus the export demand for wheat can be a very volatile element of 
the total demand. One reason for this volatility in exports is that 
many of the variables that effect export demand are exogenous to the 
United States wheat system. Some of these variables, such as weather, 
play an important role and are quite difficult to predict successfully 
on a long-term basis. The two major components of export demand are 
conmercial exports and exports under government programs. 
Commercial exports are heavily dependent upon world crop condi-
tions and policy decisions of foreign governments. If world produc-
tion is high and world price is low the United States commercial wheat 
exports have a tendency to be low. This type of situation comes about 
when wheat cannot be purchased for export at competitive world price 
because of government programs supporting wheat prices. Canada and 
Australia are also surplus producers and will have exports available 
in most crop years. 
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Exports under government programs, such as Public Law 480 have 
often accounted for 60 percent or more of the wheat exports of the 
United States. When the United States has large stocks of grain these 
government programs can become particularly important. This division 
of wheat export demand is thus highly dependent upon government action. 
Aggregate Supply 
The supply of wheat is typically thought of as ;beginning year 
carry-in plus production and imports. The importation of wheat is small 
in. relation to the total supply and will.,not be considered separately. 
Thus carry-in and producti.on remain as the important variables in fore-
casting the total supply of wheat in any one crop year. 
Beginning Year Carry-in 
The beginning year carry-in is synonomous with the ending year 
inventory of the past crop year. That is, carry-in is what remained 
of the past year's crop after ~upply and demand forces allocated the 
co1T1110dity. It is desirable to have an "adequate" level of carry-in 
in case of large scale crop failures or some other catastrophe. On the 
other tland an "excessive" carry-in will have a dampening effect on 
prices. The carry-in is dependent on the supply and demand factors 
that affected last year's crop. From the standpoint of price dis-
covery, the supply and demand levels for the last year's crop are 
fairly well known by the begin.ning of the new crop year. 
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Production 
The greatest area of wheat production in the United States comes 
from the states that make up the Great Plains, with the state of Kansas 
the leading producer. Hard wheat, which is especially suited for 
making bread flour, is grown mainly in this region. White wheat is 
grown in the northwest where the state of Washington is a leading 
producer. 
The factors affecting wheat production are basically considered 
to be those variables that come about directly from the supply-demand 
relationships. However, this relationship may be altered slightly by 
several different factors. 
Government action is one factor that is irrrnensely important. A 
governmental decision to limit production is usually carried out in a 
program that affects the number of acres planted. Another factor, but 
one that is usually less important, is weather. Adverse weather 
conditions can reduce yields substantially. However, because wheat 
production is carried on over a wide area, the chance of a "total crop 
failure" is quite unlikely. 
The United States Department of Agriculture makes production 
estimates for wheat during the crop year in the months of December, for 
winter wheat, and May for all wheat. Estimates are continued monthly 
after May until the estimate is made for that crop year's production 
of winter wheat in December. These estimates are usually issued around 
the 11th of the following month reflecting conditions of the last of the 
previous month. 
Forecasting prices from estimates of demand and estimates of 
supply is required on a continuous basis by most firms involved in 
marketing wheat. Both cash and futures markets exist which assist in 
this discovery process. 
Characteristics of Two Markets for Pricing Wheat 
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Chicago, Il 1 i no is and Kansas City, Missouri are two of. the major 
markets for hard red winter wheat. Kansas City is located near the 
center of production. Chicago is located in the general direction 
involved in moving wheat from production areas ;to some of the major 
consuming areas of the central and eastern regions of the United States. 
Location Differences 
The marketing areas of the two locations under simplified assump-
tions of equal prices and transfer costs would be separated by a straight 
line equi-distant between the two locations and perpendicular to a 
straight line connecting the two markets. With major consumption 
located east of Chicago and major export points located south of Kansas 
City, simple analysis would show Chicago supplying the population 
centers with flour for domestic consumption with some chance for a 
small amount of exports. The Kansas City market would then serve all 
of the Gulf export points and some small amount of domestic consumption 
in that area. This analysis would be valid for ceteris paribus condi-
tions. 
Transfer Cost Advantages 
In the 11 real world", however, all things are not equal. The 
11 transit 11 system of rail rates changes the relative advantages of 
specific locations. The transit system of rail rates was designed to 
neutralize the advantage of flour millers located in production areas 
over the millers located in the population centers. Prior to the 
instigation of this system, flour and wheat moved at the same rates 
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per hundredweight. Thus the reduction in weight by milling caused 
rates to favor those flour millers located in the regions of production. 
Under the transit system the total freight cost from wheat origin to 
flour destination would be equal regardless of the location of the 
flour mill between the two points. Transit privileges applied not 
only to milling but to storage as well. The system permitted millers 
in various locations to compete equally with regard to transportation 
costs. 
However it did not make all mill locations equally competitive 
in a given market. A 1968 study by Mailee and Solum [13] resulted in 
the following illustration. Their study showed how the transit rate 
scheme had a suffocating effect on the eastern milling industry. 
Figure l shows the effect of transit privileges on the market areas of 
the eastern millers. This illustration involves Kansas City and Pitts-
burg as the two milling areas under consideration. The idea behind 
Figure l is that the transit privileges operate on only substantiall~ 
straight lines between wheat production areas and flour markets. Thus 
Kansas City millers can more readily market flour in the area just west 
of Pittsburg because transit privileges would not be in effect for wheat 






Figure 1. The Effective Marketing Area of Flour Mills Under the Transit Rate System 
N 
O'> 
moving back west from Pittsburg. A Kansas City mill draws supplies 
from its transit arc to the west and can obtain transit rates on 
flour shipments within its arc to the east. The Pittsburg arc is 
arrived at in a similar way. Even though the Pittsburg market enjoys 
a much larger supply region than does Kansas City it is of little 
use becuase of the limited market area. Thus for markets west of 
Pittsburg or 11 off 11 the transit privilege line the Kansas City market 
has little or no competition from the Pittsburg market. 
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The analysis of Mailee and Solum can be changed slightly to show 
the effects of transit privilege upon the two markets of interest in 
this study. If it is assumed that the same relationships exist now as 
did during the Mailee and Solum study such that the areas where transit 
privileges are granted are delineated in a similar manner, the result 
would be as shown in Figure 2. In this example, the supply area for 
the Chicago mill is much smaller than for the Kansas City mill. The 
Kansas City mill has a smaller effective market area with which to work. 
In addition the Chicago mill serves a more densely populated area that 
would have much greater flour demands than the Kansas City market area. 
It is evident that even though both markets have equal transportation 
costs going east, the Chicago market must pay a higher rate to ship 
wheat or wheat produ~ts to the west or outside the area where the 
transit privilege pertains. 
The major wh~at exporting regions of the United States can be 
divided into four coastal areas. The bade divisions are the Great 
Lak~s area, the Atlantic area, the Gulf area and the Pacific area. In 
terms of the level of export activity of each area the Gulf ports are 
certainly the leader. Over the past few years the Gulf ports have 
Arc 
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Figure 2. The Effective Marketing Area of Flour Mills Located in Chicago and Kansas 




seldom exported less than 50 percent of the total exports of the United 
States. The ports of Houston and New Orleans are of major importance 
in this area. 
Grains being transferred by rail to points for export are able 
to receive lower rates than those for domestic movement. In addition 
the transit privilege is also applied here. If wheat is stored at 
some point between the export point and the point of production it 
may continue its• movement to the export area at some later date for 
the same cost per unit of distance as before. An example of this type 
of pricing is that wheat currently being moved from Kansas City to 
Houston for domestic use can be shipped for $1 .44 per cwt. The same 
distance would cost $0.90 per cwt. if the wheat is going for export. 
· In past years there have been international agreements among 
several countries concerning the exportation and importation of wheat 
as well as other grains. Generally these agreements arrived at a 
world price for wheats of various qualities and origins. If the 
domestic price of wheat for export in the United States was higher than 
the net cost to buyers, government payments were made to exporters for 
the difference. Occasionally, the opposite situation came about such 
that the government received a refund from exporters. However, the 
domestic price was above the world price and the payment rate averaged 
nine cents per bushel over the entire 12 months of the 1971-72 crop 
year. In the first three months of the 1972-73 crop year the payment 
rate was 12, 33 and 18 cents per bushel respectively. In October of 
1972 export payments were suspended for wheat. 
The major question to be answered by this study arises again. How 
does the amount of wheat demanded for export affect the two markets 
relative to each other? 
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It has already been shown that a large percentage of the grain 
shipped for export goes through the Gulf port area. The grain exported 
through these ports is primarily hard winter wheat that was produced in 
the Great Plains area. Typically the grain moves from points of produc-
tion to local elevators. From there it may go to the Gulf for export. 
The move.ment of wheat from local elevators to the Gulf is normally 
either done by truck, rail or barge. The Kansas City market area is 
quite fortunate in that it is both a major rail center and on a water-
way to the Gulf. This factor makes Kansas City a logical/market for 
the local elevators. Even if the grain is not sold in the Kansas City 
market it is often priced using the Kansas City market. 
The Chicago market also has an export facility available. The 
grain is shipped out through the lakes. This shipping route is often 
more costly to most foreign destinations than is the route from the 
Gulf area. In addition the Chicago export route is closed several 
months during the winter. 
Briefly, it seems that Kansas City is better located to take 
advantage of export demand than is Chicago. Periods of exaggerated 
export demand would appear to favor the Kansas City market relative 
to the Chicago market. Conversely, periods of slack export demand would 
be expected to favor Chicago relative to Kansas City, all other things 
equal. 
Futures Market Contract Specifications 
The Chicago Board of Trade is the major wheat futures market. 
During the time period of this study Chicago had from two to four 
times as many open contracts as Kansas City. Kansas City in turn is 
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the second largest futures market. In contrast, the Chicago cash market 
is of secondary importance to Kansas City. Kansas City is both a hub 
of milling activity for the domestic market and a pricing point for 
the export market. A major portion of the wheat exported from the United 
States goes through the Gulf using Kansas City as the base for pricing. 
Examination of the futures contracts of each of the exchanges 
indicates that the Kansas City contract calls for delivery of hard 
red winter wheat whereas the contract at Chicago allows for delivery 
of hard spring wheat and soft red winter wheat as well as hard red 
winter wheat. Number 2 soft red winter wheat is deliverable to Chicago 
or Toledo at par with the other classes deliverable through a set of 
discounts and premiums. At one time the Kansas City Board of Trade 
broadened its contract to allow deliveries of other contracts but the 
contract allowing delivery of soft wheats in Kansas City fell into 
disuse in 1953. 1 The contract was then made more selective calling for 
delivery of hard winter wheat only. This aspect of the Kansas City 
contract makes it highly desirable for hedging by millers of hard 
winter wheat if delivery of wheat is involved. In contrast, the Chicago 
contract is broad and can be used by all hedgers. Both markets, however, 
have advantages in terms of hedging. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Holbrook Working, 11 Whose Markets? Evidence on Some Aspects of 
Futures Traping 11 , The Journal of Marketing, July 1954. 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF CHICAGO-KANSAS CITY JULY 
INTERMARKET PRICE DIFFERENTIALS 
In thi.s study the price differential between the two markets was 
defined as the Chicago closing wheat futures quote less the Kansas City 
closing wheat futures quote on the same day in the contract month. This 
was done as a matter of convenience. The price differential could have 
been defined in the opposite way with direction of influence of the 
variables simply reversed. 
Identification of the directions of effect of variables on the price 
differential is somewhat more difficult than on the price itself. 
Economic theory provides one basis for detennining the direction of 
influence of variables which affect the price of wheat. Thus the rela-
tionships between the futures price at Kansas City and selected variables 
may be straight forward. However, the relationship of these same 
variables with the price differential often .may not be clear. 
Thursday Price 
There are several reasons for choosing Thursday's price for use in 
the model. The use of one day of the week as a representative of the 
entire week should restrict the analysis to a midweek price. On Friday 
there may be a lot of liquidation of contracts by people who do not wish 
to hold their position over the weekend. This is in contrast to Monday 
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when speculative reaction to weekend news may be greatest. Having 
removed both Monday's and Friday's price from consideration there was 
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1 i ttl e difference among the other three choices of the week. · However 
Thursday's price was selected because of the availability of data on 
related variables. Grain Market News, which was mentioned ear1ier, 
contains Thursday's price of all cash price series that were used. Some 
non-price data are available that are not recorded on Thursday. One 
of these is the 1evel of inspections of wheat for export within the 
next thirty days which is reported on Friday of each week. 
The data that were not available on Thursday were put into the 
model so that the effect would be felt on the Thursday direct1y 
following its release. One problem in this area was the question of 
when to input the commitments of traders data. The observations were 
taken at midmonth and month's end but later in the study only at month's 
end. However the information is typica11y not released to the public 
unti1 about ten days after the observations were taken. The question 
becomes whether to put the data into the model on the day the observa-
tion was taken or the day the information was released to the public. 
It was decided that since an explanatory equation was being formulated 
the data should be introduced on the day the observations were taken. 
If a predictive equation were desired it might have been more interesting 
to note the reaction of traders to the new information on the date it 
was released. 
July Contract 
This study will focus primarily on the intermarket price differ-
entials of the July contract. Several factors contributed to the choice 
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of July as the contract month to study. First the July contract (along 
with the May) has been the most heavily and consistently traded of the 
contract months. The use of this contract month, therefore, had less 
chance of encountering missing data than some of the other contracts. 
A second factor which weighed heavily in the selection of the contract 
month to study was the need to find a contract which was used heavily 
by hedgers of hard red winter wheat. The contract month chosen by the 
hedger depends on when the wheat is to be marketed. Paul, Heifner and 
Helmuth [15] stated that normally the hedger should sell the contract 
that calls for delivery just after the planned storage interval is 
terminated. This would indicate the July futures contract should be 
used to hedge any wheat that is to be sold at harvest or shortly there-
after. In Oklahoma, the largest percentage of monthly wheat marketings 
occur in June (Table II). Thus the July contract could be used in the 
hedge and is of interest in this study. 
A final factor that attributed to the selection of the July 
contract for use in this study was the month of July facilitated easy 
division of the study into crop or contract years. Prior to June 1, 
1976 the wheat marketing year or crop year was defined by the United 
States Department of Agriculture as July l through June 30. Due to 
"technological developments in wheat production" which caused a greater 
portion of the crop to be harvested prior to June 30, the wheat 
marketing year was changed to June l through May 31. The mar~eting 
year begins before ~any major amount of wheat is harvested and ends just 
prior to the next year's harvest. 
The contract futures quotes for July, on the other harid, span 
the crop year. Trading in the old July futures contract terminates on 
TABLE II 
MONTHLY FARM MARKETINGS OF OKLAHOMA 1 S WINTER WHEAT EXPRESSED 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL SALES, CROP YEARS 
1965-66 THROUGH 1974-75 
Crop Year May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar 
(Percent) 
1965 4 36 8 4 4 5 6 10 11 5 5 
1966 2 41 7 4 5 3 5 10 7 6 7 
1967 6 33 8 3 3 4 4 13 13 6 5 
1968 2 39 10 5 4 7 6 7 8 4 4 
1969 3 38 9 4 4 5 5 10 9 5 5 
1970 2 28 6 8 16 6 4 6 8 5 5 
1971 2 39 8 6 5 6 5 7 9 5 4 
1972 8 29 13 18 8 2 3 5 7 3 2 
1973 2 30 18 16 8 4 3 5 7 3 2 
1974 3 21 10 8 13 11 5 7 6 5 6 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture and Oklahoma Department of Agriculture, Oklahoma 















the eighth trading day before the end of the Month (July). Even though 
a 11 new 11 July contract rray be traded several months before the 11 old 11 
July contract expires, the 11 new 11 contract will not be examined in this 
study until the 11 0 l d11 ·contract expires. The contract year therefore 
refers to the quotes for the July contract during the period beginning 
the first week in August and continuing through the third week of July. 
The amount of wheat not utilized during the current crop year is 
reported as the next year's carry-in of stocks. 
The July futures price should reflect the "best current estimate" 
of what the price of wheat will be in July as the contract matures. If 
everyone had perfect information the expected July price would remain 
constant throughout the year. However, since this is not the case and 
the information available changes over time, the price of the futures 
contract fluctuates. Also since the July contract matures in the next 
crop marketing year, it is influenced both by the expected size of 
next year's wheat crop and by the size of the current carry-over 
supplies. 
Throughout the study the terms crop year and contract year will 
refer to the year from the first Thursday in August to the third 
Thursday in July. If another meaning is intended it will be mentioned. 
The Time Period 
The 1965-66 through 1973-74 crop marketing years were selected for 
the study. Data are available on all the variables to be included in 
the study on a continuous basis. The period covers several years in 
which there were large government surpluses and as many years as 
possible were the government-held stocks were low. In addition a time 
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period encompassing nine full crop and contract years should allow for 
significant changes in the relatively slow moving variables. 
One slow moving variable was the magnitude of unbalanced hedging 
at Kansas City. From the early to middle 1960 1 s, net hedging at Kansas 
City was heavily unbalanced by an exceptionally large amount of short 
hedging. However, in the early 1970 1s the trend began to change to 
more nearly balanced hedging. This type of phenomena would be expected 
to affect the spread and permit the Kansas City market to carry a 
greater hedging load. Ideally the time period should be as long as 
possible to reflect trends in variables such as net hedging. 
Intermarket Price Correlation 
The futures prices at the two markets, are highly interrelated. 
Over the aggregate time period, the simple correlation coefficient 
between the futures closing prices at Chicago and Kansas City on 
Thursday of each week was 0.99. However, one particular variable may 
affect one market more than the other. An example might be the cash 
price of wheat at the Gulf. A change in this price would be taken into 
account both at Kansas City and Chicago but the greatest affect could 
be registered at Kansas City because of its geographical proximity 
and the fact that wheat for export at the Gulf is often priced on the 
basis of Kansas City price. Conversely a change in the cash price of 
soft wheat in Chicago probably could have a larger effect on the Chicago 
futures market than on the Kansas City market. In some cases there are 
variables which do not have a theoretical basis for determining the 
direction of effect. 
Model 
The explanatory model of the intermarket price differential for 
July wheat closes between the Kansas City and Chicago Boards of Trade 
is shown below in Equation (1). It is made up of nine variables that 
are thought to be economically significant. 
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Equation (1) 
The variables included in the above model are summarized with the 
unit of measure accompanying each designation as follows: 
Y = Chicago-Kansas City intermarket price differential of the 
July contract's Thursday close (cents per bushel) 
x1 = The Gulf price of No. 1 Hard Winter ordinary protein wheat 
(cents per bushel) 
x2 = Inspections for export (1 ,000,000 bushels) 
x3 =The Gulf basis (cents per bushel) 
x4 = Wheat-corn price ratio at the Gulf (botn prices in cents 
per bushel) 
x5 = Long hedging by reporting traders on the Kansas City Board 
of Trade (1 ,000,000 bushels) 
x6 = The ratio of short hedging, reported by large traders at 
Kansas City, to total open interest 
x7 = Short reported spreading at Kansas City less long reported 
spreading at Kansas City (1 ,000,000 bushels) 
x8 =Total open interest on the Chicago Board of Trade (l,000,000 
bushels) 
x9 = Short reported speculation at Chicago less long reported 
speculation (1 ,000,000 bushels) 
Correlation Among Independent Variables 
Multicollinearity or linear dependence among vectors of independent 
variables in a multiple linear regression analysis can have serious 
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effects on the estimation of parameters. Mason, Gunst and Webster [14] 
', 
note that poor precision in the estimation of individual parameters does 
not necessarily imply that the estimated model is a poor predictor. In 
addition if the estimated model is restricted to situations where the 
multicollinearity holds, at least approximately, the prediction equation 
often works quite well. That is, individual parameters may be estimated 
poorly but the linear combination may be estimated well. 
The following segment of this chapter will look into the correla-
tion problems that may be present, first in the price related variables 
and then in the variables taken from the conmitments of trader informa-
ti on. 
Price Variables. The three price-related variables that were 
included in this study (Gulf price of wheat, wheat-corn price ratio and 
the Gulf basis) do occasionally display high degrees of correlation 
within a crop year. However, it was deemed important to include not 
only an absolute level of the cash wheat price but the level of wheat 
price relative to that of corn. A change in relative prices such that 
wheat became competitive as a feed grain could be an important indi-
cator of a change in potential utilization. In addition the Gulf 
basis may indicate the relative strength of demand for exports at the 
Gulf. The Gulf price of wheat indicates this to some extent but may 
not encompass the full effect of changes in export demand. Several 
other price related variables were analyzed before omitting them 
from the final model .1 
Corrmitments of Traders Variables. Several transformations of the 
commitments of traders information were studied but not included in the 
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final model. 2 Some were not included because they added little to 
the statistical quality of the model and others were excluded because 
of high correlation with other independent variables. For this study, 
no commitments of traders variables or transformation of those variables 
were used in the final model if the simple correlation coefficient 
between the two was greater than 0.80 over the complete time period. 
A correlation coefficient of 0.80 was simply a rule of thumb employed. 
Explanatory Equations 
The explanatory equations of each of the nine crop years included 
in this study are presented in Table III. Statistical coefficients 
were estimated to determine the equations used in explaining the move-
ments of the intermarket price differential within each respective crop 
year. In addition to the equations for each crop year, Table II also 
includes the explanatory equation for the aggregate pet:iod which 
encompasses the 1965-66 through 1973-74 crop years. Beneath each regres-
sion coefficient is its• associated t-value. The average value of the 
intermarket price difference is included for each crop year. The coef-
ficient of determination (R2) for each model is also presented in the 
last row of the table. 
Criteria for Selection of Equations 
Results reported in this chapter are based on the 11 best11 explana-
tory equations arrived at for each crop year. The 11 best 11 explanatory 
equation was the equation which explained the largest amount of varia-
tion in the price differential and had all of the regression coefficients 
statistically significant at the 80 percent level. The coefficient 
TABLE II I 
STATISTICAL COEFFICIENTS FOR REGRESSIONS OF SPECIFIED VARIABLES ON CHICAGO-KANSAS CITY 
JULY WHEAT FUTURES PRICE DIFFERENTIALS, CROP YEARS 1965-66 THROUGH 1973-74 
1965-66 . 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 Aggregate 
Average Price 
Differential 2.091 -2.858 l .860 -1. 551 4.517 7.960 1.426 8.245 -2.578 l .690 
Intercept 27.086 l .952 -42.423 46.254 39.792 33.400 29.013 l. 289 24.975 8.128 
Variables* 
x1 Gulf Price -0.185 0.108 0.208 -0 .179 0.481 -0.265 0. 124 -0.005 
(9. 41) (3.38) (8.45) ( l. 70) (3.18) (3.33} (7 .17) ( l. 55) 
x2 Exports -0.071 0 .051 0.395 
(l .40} ( l. 59) (9.82) 
x3 Gulf Basis 0.211 0.512 -0. 307 0.299 -0.081 -0. l 00 0.022 
(4.28) (2.76) ( l. 87) (4.64) (2. 19) (3.39} (l.46) 
x4 Price -12.898 -11.997 -34. 765 -11.807 -20.428 9.129 -18.767 
Ratio W/C (2. 01} (4.26) (6.00) (l. 71} (4. 97) ( 2 .14) (11.72) 
x5 Long Hedging ,. -0.385 -0 .173 -0.052 0.400 0 .160 -0.189 0.022 
(4.85) (l .91) (l.47) (2.89) (3.30) ( 7. 12) (l .54) 
x6 Short Hedging 13. 798 -15.035 24.470 -5. 684 l 0. 493 -2.459 15.555 
Ratio (3.04) (3.78) (6.90} (2.23) (2.27) (l .81} (5 .12} 
x7 Net Spreading -1.493 -3.937 - 7. 824 0.869 
(6.24) (3.22) (3.29) (6.43) 
x8 Chicago Open 0.014 0.013 0.040 -0.092 -0.042 0.123 -0.277 
Interest ( l.41) (2.76) (3. 75) (4.36) (4.36) (3.22) (5.92) 
x9 Chicago Net -0.150 0.137 0.085 -0.220 -0 .197 -0.099 
Spec. (4.75) (4.17) (l. 61) (2.48) (3.64) (3.54) 
R2 .928 .895 . 963 .627 .841 .586 . 510 .904 .445 .558 
*Gulf Price = Gulf price of wheat, Exports =Wheat inspections for export, Gulf Oasis = Gulf price of wheat less the July Kansas 
City futures close on the same day, Price Ratio W/C = Gulf price of wheat divided by the Gulf price of corn, Long Hedging = Long reported 
hedging at Kansas City, Short Hedging Ratio = Short reported hedging at Kansas City divided by total open interest, Net Spreading = Short 
less long reported spreading at Kansas City, Chicago Open Interest = Total open interest at Chicago, Chicago Net Spec. = Short less long 
reported speculation at Chicago. ..p. 
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of determination (R2) was used to measure the share of variation 
explained. Student's t statistics were used to test the null hypo-
thesis H0: B=O against the two tailed alternative H : a 
Variables 
BfO. 
Delineation of each of the nine variables• expected influence 
and its• actual relationship with the intermarket price difference, 
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within crop years and over the entire period, will be discussed below. 
Average Price Differential 
The average i ntermarket price difference between the Chi ca go and 
Kansas City Thursday closing quotes over the entire period was 1 .690. 
However, the average price diff~rential during the crop year was close 
to this only twice while ranging from -2.858 to 8.245. 
Cash Price of Wheat at the Gulf 
Expectation. The cash wheat price series at the Gulf (X1) is 
for No. 1 hard red winter wheat, ordinary protein content. The price 
is reported in cents per bushel f .o.b. track. The data were collected 
from Grain Market News, published weekly by the United States Department 
of Agriculture. The cash grain market and the futures market are very 
closely related. Futures bids, especially near month, are based on 
many of the same variables that determine cash prices. As the cash 
price declines so may the futures price. However, the question is 
which of the two futures markets move more as the cash price at the 
Gulf changes. It is hypothesized that the cash wheat price at the 
Gulf and the intermarket price differential would be negatively related 
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if the Gulf price were the only wheat price related variable in the 
model. That is, if the price of wheat at the Gulf increases in response 
to favorable export news, the Kansas City futures price would be 
expected to increase more than the Chicago futures price, all other 
things equal. Undoubtedly a change in the Gulf price of wheat would 
also be reflected in the Chicago futures price to some extent. 
Result. The cash price of wheat at the Gulf (X1) was included as 
a significant variable in seven of the nine crop-year equations. The 
regression coefficient on this variable was -0.185 during the 1965 
crop year. This suggests that during the 1965 crop year if the Gulf 
price of wheat rose by one cent per bushel, a 0.185 cent per bushel 
decrease would be expected in the intermarket price difference. An 
inverse relationship was expected if the Kansas City futures quote was 
assumed to be affected more by a change in this variable than was the 
Chicago futures quote. A positive relationship would suggest a greater 
change in the futures quote at Chicago. This variable was not consistent 
as to the sign on the regression coefficient. In the seven crop years 
in which the variable was included it carried a positive sign four times 
and a negative sign three. This inconsistency is manifest in the 
aggregate model where x1 has a relatively low t-value and the magnitude 
of the coefficient is quite small due to an averaging effect.. It is 
evident the Gulf price of wheat often affects the intermarket price 
difference. Usually one market wi 11 react more than the other through-
out a crop year. However neither market seems to react consistently 
with respect to the other. 
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Inspections for Export 
Expectation. Under the U. S. Grain Standards Act, grain must be 
inspected before it is allowed to be exported. The quantity of grain 
inspected for export (X2) is published each week in Grain Market News. 
This calculation does not include truck or rail shipments to Canada or 
Mexico. It is hypothesized that an increase in exports would increase 
the activity in both markets but would increase activity in the Kansas 
City market more than in Chicago because of its geographical proximity 
to the export areas of the Gulf. Exports are expressed in units of 
1 ,000,000 bushels. 
Re~ul~. Only three times was the export variable (X2) included 
in explanatory equations. The variable was included in two crop-year 
equations (one positive and one negative relationship) with low levels 
of statistical significance. The variable was included in the aggre-
gate equation and was highly significant carrying a t-value of 9.82. 
The regression coefficient on x2 of 0.395 in the aggregate model indi-
cates that an increase in the intermarke.t price differential of nearly 
0.4 cents per bushel would result from a 1 ,000,000 bushel increase in 
inspections for export during the aggregate time period. The fact that 
inspections for export were highly significant over the entire study 
period but not within the crop year indicates that weekly export 
inspections offer little information useful in explaining the intracrop 
year price difference but the leve1 of exports throughout the year are 




Expectation. Gulf basis (X3) is usually defined as the difference 
between the cash wheat price at the Gulf and the most current futures 
month trading that is not in the delivery month. However, for this 
study the Gulf basis was defined as the difference between the cash 
price of wheat at the Gulf and the Kansas City July futures contract 
close on the same day. With the Gulf basis defined as such, it is 
obvious that if the Gulf wheat price were assumed constant an inverse 
relationship would exist between the Gulf price and the Kansas City 
futures quote. However the relationship of interest is the one 
between the Gulf basis and the intermarket price difference. It is 
expected that the relationship will be a negative one for the most 
part. A change in the Gulf basis is expected to affect the Kansas City 
futures quote more than the Chicago quote because of Kansas City's 
proximity to the Gulf ports. This should be especially true in periods 
of peak export demand. The Gulf basis is also of interest at £hicago 
and in some instances Chicago could react more to this information 
than Kansas City causing a negative relationship. 
Result. The statistical coefficients associated with the Gulf 
basis (X3) were not consistent in their relationships to the inter-
market price difference over the crop years. In the six explanatory 
equations that included x3, three times the sign on the coefficient 
was positive and three times it was negative. In the aggregate equa-
tion the regression coefficient was of smaller magnitude and lesser 
significance than the same coefficient for any of the separate crop 
years. This situation is similar to the one for the Gulf price of 
wheat (X2). Normally in a crop year one of the futures markets was ' 
affected more by a change in the Gulf basis than the other. However 
over the long run neither market was clearly a consistent leader. It 
should be noted that two of the three negative coefficients occur 
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during the 1972 and 1973 crop years. The third, the least statistically 
significant, occurred during the 1969 crop year. Thus the two coef-
ficients with the highest significance level occurred in the crop years 
when the coefficient of variation associated with the Gulf price of 
wheat went from 2.037 in the 1971 crop year to 11.836 and 13,683 in 
the 1972 and 1973 crop years respectively. The regression coefficient 
on x3 during the· 1966 crop year of 0.211 indicates that as the Gulf 
basis increased one cent per bushel, during that year, an associated 
0.211 cents per bushel increase came about in the intermarket price 
difference. 
Wheat-Corn Price Ratio at the Gulf 
Expectation. The wheat-corn price ratio (X4) is determined by 
dividing the cash wheat price at the Gulf, discussed earlier, by the 
cash price of No. 2 yellow corn at the Gulf. Both of these prices are 
in cents per bushel. An inverse relationship is expected between the 
wheat-corn price ratio at the Gulf and the intermarket price differ-
ential. For illustration assume that the price of wheat at the Gulf 
increases relative to the corn price and moves away from a feeding 
value of wheat because of increased export demand. If the Kansas City 
price reflects this increase in export demand more than Chicago, a 
negative relationship would exist between the price ratio and the 
intermarket differential. On the other hand, if the ratio is declining 
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(wheat becoming cheaper relative to corn) this would reflect pressure 
on wheat prices to move toward feed prices which should be reflected in 
lower Kansas City prices relative to Chicago prices and an increase in 
the differential. The resulting relationship is again negative. 
Result. The wheat-corn price ratio at the Gulf (X4) was an 
important explanatory variable both in the individual crop-year equa-
tions and the aggregate period equation. No other variable was signifi-
cant in as many crop year equations as x4, while showing as much con-
sistency in the direction of influence as it did. In three of the six 
crop-year equations that included x4, it showed higher statistical 
significance than any other variable. This ratio was also the most 
significant variable in the aggregate crop-year equation. The wheat-
corn price ratio was included in six explanatory crop-year equations 
and the aggregate equation. Only once (1973) was the sign of the 
regression coefficient not as expected (positive). The magnitudes of 
the regression coefficients, other than the positive one, ranged from 
-11 .807 to -34.765. The consistency in the magnitude of the coefficient 
across crop years is important. In addition the coefficient. in the 
aggregate period equation was quite similar in magnitude to those in 
the crop years while being the most statistically significant variable 
in the equation. An interpretation of the regression coefficient on 
x4 over the aggregate period would show that during this time period 
if the ratio increased from its mean level of 1.316 to 1 .448 an 
accompanying decrease of 1 .877 cents per bushel would come about in· 
the intermarket price difference. 
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Reported Long Hedging at Kans.as City 
Expectation. The long hedging series (X5) is derived from the 
positions of all traders on the Kansas City Board of Trade who have 
been classified as hedgers and whose long positions in the market are 
in excess of the required reporting level. The reporting requirements 
are set by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). For wheat, 
the reporting level currently is 200,000 bushels. The series, in 
1 ,000,000 bu~hel units, was used for the monthly or twice monthly 
intervals as the data were available. Long reporting hedgers may have 
estimated that prices would move higher and decided to enter the market 
or they may have acted to maintain their fully hedged positions. The 
variable would have a negative relationship with the differential if 
the net effect were to strengthen the Kansas City price. The causality 
of effect could be in the opposite direction. That is, a narrowing 
differential could attr9ct long hedging at Kansas City from Chicago. 
Result. The statistical coefficients for long reported hedging at 
Kansas City (X 5) were negative in four of the six crop-year equations 
in which they were included. The negative relationships were expected 
but the two positive relationships can be explained by the fact that a 
narrowing differential could attract long hedgers from Chicago to place 
their hedges with Kansas City. The regression coefficient for long 
reported hedging at Kansas City during the 1965 crop year would suggest 
that during that year an increase in the level of long reported hedging 
at Kansas City was associated with a decrease in the price differential 
of 0.385 cents per bushel. As was the case with several of the pre-
viously discussed variables the regression coefficient in the aggregate 
er.op-year equation showed the affects of averaging al 1 the yearly 
coefficients and thus the magnitude of the coefficient during the 
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aggregate period was much smaller than those for each crop year as was 
its• significant level. 
Ratio of Short Hedging to Open Interest 
at Kansas City 
Expectation~ The short hedging-open interest ratio is calculated 
by dividing the total positions of short hedgers, who hold positions in 
excess of CFTC position_ limits, by the total open interest. for the 
Kansas City Board of Trade as is reported in commitments of traders 
information. This variable does not indicate absolute levels of short 
hedging. However, it does give information concerning changes in short 
hedging. If short hedging and open interest increase by the same 
amount, the change in the ratio will be quite small. If short hedging 
increases at Kansas City and open interest remains unchanged there has 
been a change in the mix of contracts held. It is expected that large 
short hedgers would enter the futures market based on long inventory 
positions which would decrease the futures price at Kansas City. A 
positive relationship between the intermarket price difference and this 
ratio would be expected, assuming Chicago futures price constant. 
Result. The ratio of reported short hedging to total open interest 
at Kansas City (X6) was included in explanatory equations for six of 
the nine crop years and in the aggregate equation. In' the explanatory 
equation for the aggregate. The regression coefficient on X 
6 
was 15.555. This coefficient suggests that during the aggregate period 
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an increase in x6 from its mean level of 0.847 to 0.889 was associated 
with a 0.777 cent per bushel increase in the intermarket price difference. 
The signs of the regression coefficients were not consistent. Half of 
the crop-year equations had positive coefficients and half negative. 
However the coefficient on x6 in the aggregate period equation was 
approximately the same magnitude of other positive coefficients in the 
equation. In addition its associated t-value showed that the variable 
was statistically significant. 
Net Intermarket Spreading at Kansas City 
Expectation. The commitments of traders information gives the 
level of long and short spreading that is reported at Kansas City. The 
information includes each trader's long and short positions, to the 
extent they are balanced, without regard to which crop year or market 
is involved. Therefore the long and short spread positions will differ 
by the amciunt of i ntermarket spread fog. Net i ntermarket spreading for 
this study was calculated by finding the difference between long and 
short reported spreading in l ,000,000 bushel units. The calculation 
used in this study does include spreading between Kansas City and 
Chicago and spreading bewteen Kansas City and Minneapolis but assumes 
that all spreading is applicable to the Chicago market. Gray [7], in 
his 1967 study, also assumed that all intermarket spreading involved 
Chicago as one market. He stated that this probably was not literally 
true but felt the assumption was justifiable on the following three 
grounds. · First, he held discussion~ with traders who actively eng,aged 
in intermarket spreading and they doubted the existence of any substantial 
s prea.di ng between the two sma 11 er markets. Second, he found no 
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correlation between net spreading for Kansas City and Minneapolis but 
each had an inverse relationship with Chicago. Last, net spreading at 
Kansas City was typically a much 1 largerfigure-refative to Minneapolis 
which would allow for only a small portion to be spread to Minneapolis. 
Gray went·on to explain that he felt intermarket spreaders did not 
attempt to forecast prices. He stated that intermarket spreaders were 
more "hedge anticipators 11 • Thus he concluded that if the intermarket 
difference bewteen Kansas City and Chi ca go were "out of 1 i ne 11 , spreading 
positions should not be expected to reflect this unless the hedging 
positions had brought about the the misalignment. 
If Gray's findings are accepted, the sign on the intermarket 
spreading variable would be expected to be ambiguous. Thus, this 
variable might not be useful in a predictive equation but could be 
useful in an explanatory model as indicative of the direction of price 
misalignment at a given point in time which has resulted from hedging 
· needs in the Kansas City market. If i.ntermarket spreading results from 
a downward pressure on Kansas City prices from another variable, then 
spreading and price differentials will be positively correlated. On 
the other hand if i nterma_rket spreading results from a downward pres-
sure on Chicago prices, the correlation will be negative . 
. Result. Net intermarket spreading at Kansas City (X7) was included 
in only three of the crop-year explariatory equations. In each of these 
three instances the resultant relationship between x7 and the inter-
market price difference was an inverse one. However, whenever the 
variable was included in the aggregate period equation the sign on the 
regression coefficient was positive. This is consistent with a priori 
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expectations that the sign on the variable might be indeterminate. The 
coefficient on x7 during the aggregate period indicates that during this 
period an increase in net spreading at Kansas City of 200 contracts 
(l,000,000 bushels) resulted in an increase of 0.869 cents per bushel 
in the intermarket price differential. 
Open Interest at Chicago 
Expectation. A futures contract is considered open if it has been 
entered into but not yet liquidated by the purchase of an offsetting 
contract or by delivery. Contracts that are open are referred to as 
open interest. The aggregate of all long open interest is equal to the 
aggregate of all short open interest. The variable used in this study 
is reported in l ,000,000 bushel units. The level of open interest on 
the Chicago Board of Trade is expected to be an indicator of market 
activity. An increase in open interest indicates increased market 
activity but gives little indication of the direction of influence 
on the spread. 
Result. The estimated regression coefficients associated with 
open interest at Chicago (X8) carried negative signs in three crop years 
and positive signs in four. The variable did not meet the significance 
requirements for incl us ion in the aggregate ex pl ana tory equation and 
was the only one omitted. The variable was used as an indicator of the 
level of market activity. Therefore over the long run it would not be 
expected to have a large effect on the price difference. Within a year 
however the level of market activity could have a significance effect 
on the price differential. During the 1965 crop year the regression 
coefficient indicates that for every 200 contracts that open interest 
at Chicago increased, the intermarket price differential increased by 
0.014 cents per bushel. 
Net Speculation at Chicago 
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Expectation. Net speculation on the Chicago Board of Trade, as · 
used in this study, is defined as the total of large non-hedging posi-
tions. Speculation then encompasses both the spreading and long or 
short speculative positions. The level of net speculation at Chicago 
in l ,000,000 bushel units was reported either monthly or twice monthly 
and computed as the number of bushels in long positions subtracted from 
the number of bushels in short positions. If, on the average, large 
speculators at Chicago forecast lower prices and enter the market 
short, based on these expectations, a net increase in short positions 
would lower the Chicago futures price and increase net speculation, 
a negative relationship. Since this variable is anticipated to have 
very little effect on the Kansas City futures price, a negative sign 
would also be expected for the relationship between net speculation and 
the intermarket price differential. 
Result. The coefficients associated with net speculation at 
Chicago (X9) had a negative relationship with the intermarket price 
difference twice and a positive relationship three times in the crop-
year equations when x9 was included. The sign on the coefficient from 
the aggregate explanatory equation carried the expected negative sign. 
During the aggregate study period if the net speculation at Chicago 
increased by 200 contracts (1,000,000 bushels) a decrease in the 
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intermarket price differential of -0.099 cents per bushel was the 
result indicated by the regression coefficient, all other things equal. 
Coefficient of Determination 
The coefficient of determination (R2) was reported in the bottom 
row of Table III. In general these coefficients were larger in the 
earlier years of the study. Three of the last four years had small 
2 coefficients in relation to the others. The 1973 crop year had an R 
of 0.445 which was the lowest of all the crop years. This indicates 
that the four variables in the 1973 crop year equation explain over 44 
percent of the variation in the intermarket price difference. 
Other Factors 
Unbalanced Hedging at Kansas City 
In an analysis of the three major wheat futures markets, Gray [8] 
concluded that as one of the smaller market's hedging load became more 
and more unbalanced, at some point the unbalance would be reflected in 
price disparities relative to Chicago. As the hedging load on the 
smaller market becomes more unbalanced hedgers will tend to take their 
business directly to Chicago. 
Hedging at Kansas City is much more important, relatively, than 
at Chicago. On the average, reported hedging at Chicago makes up less 
than 50 percent of the total open interest whereas reported short 
hedging at Kansas City rarely makes up less than 80 percent of the 
total open interest. Because Kansas City does not have a vast reservoir 
of speculation similar to that of Chicago, unbalanced hedging is 
particularly important. An unbalanced hedging load at Chicago is not 
nearly as important because the high levels of speculation can offset 
the difference in the hedging levels. 
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The simple statistics of data for each crop year indicate that a 
significant change had taken place in the distribution between long and 
short reported hedging positions on the Kansas City Board of Trade. 
During the 1965-66 through 1969-70 crop years, net reported hedging 
at Kansas City (short less long positions) was heavily net short. 
Reported hedging at Kansas City was, on the average, net short by 9.4 
million bushels (nearly 1,900 contracts) in the 1969-70 crop year and 
by 18.4 million bushels (nearly 3,700 contracts) in the 1967-68 crop 
year. Values this large indicate a problem of matching hedging with 
speculation at Kansas City. The situation eased slightly in the 1970-71 
crop year. 
In the 1971-72 through.1973-74 crop years, the average net hedging 
at Kansas City became quite small and even turned net long by 2.3 
million bushels in the 1973-74 crop year. The 1970-71 crop year seems 
to stand alone as somewhat of a transition year bewteen years of 
balanced and unbalanced hedging at Kansas Ci~y. 
The measurable effects of the change from- unbalanced hedging in 
Kansas City to more nearly balanceq hedging is first evident in the 
1970 crop year equation. In this equation neither of the variables 
concerning hedging at Kansas City (x5 for long hedging and x6 for the 
ratio of short hedging to open interest) came in as statistically 
significant. In the earlier years both x5 and x6 were included except 
for 1968 (X6 not included). The 1970 crop year also reflected a sub-
stantial decrease in the coefficient of determination, down to 0.586 
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from 0.814 for the 1969 crop year. In the following three crop years, 
x5 was included in two crop years (1971 and 1972). When both were 
included in 1972 the coefficient of determination was 0.814. The 
highest coefficient of determination for.the other years using the 
available variables was 0.627. 
Reduction of Government Stocks 
Wheat carry-over as of July 1, 1965 was slightly over 900 million 
bushels. Approximately 75 percent of these stocks was under govern-
mental control, either under loan to the government or owned by the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Throughout the crop years of this 
study, governmentally controlled stocks were rarely below 50 percent 
of the total stocks. On July 1, 1972 the stocks of wheat totaled 
985 million bushels and over 70 percent of this was under governmental 
control. However some political decisions were made during the 1972-73 
crop year and the end result was a reduction of the level of government 
stocks. Roughly concurrent with this, another political decision was 
made in the Soviet Union calling for massive importation of grain, 
expecially wheat. Subsequently, exports of wheat from the United States 
greatly increased. Average yearly exports during the 1965 through 1971 
crop years beginning July 1 had been approximately 700 million bushels. 
In the 1972 crop year beginning July 1 exports of wheat were 1,131 
million bushels and this figure advanced to 1 ,217 million bushels the 
next year. 
The 1972 and 1973 crop years stand out as different in ~he analysis 
because of two main variables the Gulf basis (X3) and the wheat-corn price 
ratio (X4). A preliminary group of equations were estimated using the same 
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variables as in this study except that the Gulf price of wheat (X1) 
was excluded. In these preliminary equations, the Gulf basis (X3) 
was included in the equation for every year from 1965 through 1969. 
The sign of the regression coefficient was positive. Gulf basis was 
not included for the 1970 crop year. In the 1972 and 1973 crop years, 
Gulf basis was a significant variable but the signs on the regression 
coefficients were negative. The implementation of a policy to reduce 
government stock levels accompanied by the large increases in exports, 
apparently had changed the relationship from positive to negative. That 
is, Kansas City was affected ,more than Chicago by changes in the Gulf 
basis. This would be expected since the Gulf ports would handle a 
large percentage of the export sales, most of which would be hard winter 
wheat. A similar situation occurred in the preliminary study for the 
wheat-corn ratio at the Gulf. This variable had been consistently 
negative in effect and then in the 1972 and 1973 crop years the signs 
of the regression coefficients changed to positive. Thus as the price 
of wheat moved away from a feeding value based on corn prices, the 
Chicago futures quote gained on the Kansas City quote. 
FOOTNOTES 
1The price related variables that were analyzed but subsequently 
not used in the final model were the weekly change in Chicago and Kansas 
City futures closes, Thursday 1 s trading range at Chicago and Kansas City, 
and cash corn price at Kansas City and the Gulf. 
2The variables relating to the commitments of traders data that 
were studied but not included in the final model were total open 
interest at Kansas City, reported short hedging at Kansas City, reported 
short and long speculation and hedging at Chicago, reported long and 
short spreading at Chicago and Kansas City~ net reported hedging at 
Kansas City and Chicago, the ratio of long hedging to total open 
interest at Kansas City, the ratio of long hedging to short hedging 
at Kansas City, net reported spreading at Chicago and the sum of net 
reported speculation and hedging at Chicago. 
3 . . 
Robert L. Mason, R. F. Gunst and J. T. Webster, 11 Regression 
.Analysis and Problems of Multicollinearity 11 • Communications in 
Statistics, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 277-292. This article provideS-useful 
information concerning multicollinearity. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The relatively low but stable cash wheat prices during the mid- to 
late 1960's gave way to the historically high, vacillating prices of 
the early 1970's. Increased price variation brought about renewed 
interest in wheat marketing strategies. The use of forward contracting 
increased as producers attempted to reduce the risk of price changes. 
Hedging on organized commodity exchanges was one method which facili-
tated forward contracting. 
There are several futures markets on which inventories of wheat 
can be hedged. However, only two of these markets will accept hard 
winter wheat as deliverable under current contract specifications. The 
Chicago Board of Trade, by far the largest wheat futures market in 
terms of the total number of contracts traded, allows for delivery of 
hard winter wheat, northern spring wheat and soft red wheat. The 
Kansas City Board of Trade, in contrast, allows only for delivery of 
hard winter wheats against their futures contract. This aspect of 
the Kansas City futures market is particularly desirable to hedgers 
who might be interested in accepting delivery of the wheat and who 
have specific needs for hard winter wheat. 
If hedging is the tool chosen to use in forward contracting, the 
question is then one of which market should be used in placing the 
hedge. One general rule to follow could be to place the hedge with the 
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market whose par delivery point is closest to the cash market where the 
commodity will be sold. Using this simple rule, hedgers in Oklahoma 
would place their hedges on the Kansas City Board of Trade. However, if 
this rule were followed consistently there would be times when losses 
would be incurred relative to using the Chicago Board of Trade for the 
hedge. By placing hedges with the correct market in the 1972 and 1973 
crop years, the hedger could have made about 20 to 30 cents more on one 
market than the other. A correct decision by the hedger concerning 
the market in which to hedge could be as important as the decision to 
hedge itself. 
The model of the intermarket price differential that was employed 
in this study suggested that the weekly difference between Kansas City 
and Chicago July futures price quotes could be explained, to a large 
extent, using nine variables. Three of these variables were related to 
various wheat price series, one concerned inspections for export and 
the rest were taken from information concerning commitments of traders 
in commodity futures. Weekly futures quotes of the Chicago and Kansas 
City Boards of Trade were analyzed using simple linear regression 
techniques. An explanatory equation was estimated for each crop year 
and the total period. The 11 best 11 equation was then presented. 11 Best 11 , 
as used here, refers to the explanatory equation which explained the 
largest amount of variation in the price differential and all of the 
regression coefficients were statistically significant at the 80 per-
cent level. The coefficient of determination (R2) was used to measure 
the share of variation explained. 
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Conclusions 
Two statistically significant coefficients of the aggregate period 
were inspections for export (X2) and the wheat-corn price ratio (X4). 
Inspections for export was not a highly significant variable, statis-
tically, in any of the crop-year equations even though it was included 
in two years (1965 and 1967). However it was highly significant in the 
aggregate equation. This indicates that weekly inspections for export 
offer little help in explaining the intermarket price difference but 
the yearly average of this variable is quite important. An increase 
in weekly inspections for export of about 2.5 million bushels can cause 
a one cent increase in the price of Chicago futures relative to Kansas 
City, ceteris paribus. This would be an increase of approximately 
125 million bushels during the course of a crop year if the increase 
were sustained throughout the year. 
The most consistent variable in the entire study was the wheat-
corn price ratio at the Gulf (X4). It was statistically significant 
in six of the crop-year equations and in the aggregate equation. The 
sign on its associated regression coefficient was positive only once 
(1973). 'The absolute magnitude of the coefficient and the relative 
size of the associated t-value are quite similar to those within the 
crop years. The consistency .of this relationship was reflected in 
the regression coefficient on x4 of -18.767 in the aggregate equation. 
This would suggest that if the wheat-corn ratio were assumed to be at 
its mean level of 1 .316, an increase in the ratio of just over 5 percent 
would cause a once cent increase in the Kansas City futures price 
relative to Chicago. This could come about by corn price staying 
constant and wheat price increasing from tis mean of $2.19 to $2.30 
per bushel. 
Only three other variables (X7, x6, x9) displayed statistical 
significance in the aggregate equation. Net intermarket spreading 
(X7) entered into only three crop-year equations--the 1965, 1972, 
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and 1973 crop years. The sign on the coefficient was negative all 
three times but the coefficient in the aggregate equation was positive 
(0.869). This suggests that over the entire period it would take an 
increase of slightly more than 1 ,000,000 bushels (200 contracts) of 
net short spreading to increase Chicago one cent per bushel relative 
to Kansas City, ceteris paribus. 
The ratio of short hedging to open interest (X6) also had incon-
sistent signs on the regression coefficient across crop years. However, 
in the aggregate equation the regression coefficient was positive 
(15.555) and significant. This was the expected sign assuming that 
short hedgers forecast price and then take positions in the market 
accordingly. The ratio would have to increase from its mean of 0.847 
to 0.901 for the Chicago futures price to gain one cent per bushel 
relative to the Kansas City price, other things equal. This would be 
equivalent to the open interest remaining constant and the short 
hedging at Kansas City increasing from its mean of 34.547 to 36.750 
million bushels, about 440 contracts. 
Net speculation (X 9) was included in the 1966-70 crop-year 
equations and the aggregate equation. A regression coefficient of -0.099 
during the aggregate period suggests that for Kansas City to gain one 
cent per bushel relatively on Chicago, net speculation at Chicago 
would have to increase by 10,000,000 bushels (2000 contracts). Thus· 
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the intermarket price difference was not extremely sensitive to changes 
in the level of net speculation at Chicago. 
Three other variables (X1, x3, x5) entered the aggregate equation 
by just meeting the minimum requirements of statistical significance. 
Cash price of wheat at the Gulf (X1) was included in seven of the crop-
year equations and in the aggregate equation. The sign on the regression 
coefficient was positive in four of the crop-year equations and nega-
tive in three. The inconsistency of the relationship between x1 and 
the intermarket price difference is noticeable in the aggregate equa-
tion. The opposite signs had an averaging effect which reduced the 
absolute magnitude of the regression coefficient and the associated 
t-value. 
The Gulf basis (X3) suffered from many of the same problems as 
the Gulf price of wheat. This variable was statistically significant 
in six of the nine crop-year equations and in the aggregate equation. 
The regression coefficient was positive three times. Some of the in-
consistency may be due to the presence of the Gulf price of wheat in 
the equation. A preliminary study was made in which the selected 
variables were the same as in the present study except that the Gulf 
price was not included. In that analysis, the Gulf basis entered the 
crop-year equations in every year but one (1970). Each year, with the 
exception of the 1972 and 1973 crop years the sign on x3 was positive. 
Long reported hedging at Kansas City (X 5) was significant in six 
of the crop-year equations, five of the equations prior to the 1970 
crop year. This is of inte~est because the 1965-70 crop years were 
characterized by unmatched hedging at Kansas. Later in the study as 
hedging became more nearly balanced at Kansas City, the variable was 
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significant in only one crop year (1972). However this variable was 
inconsistent in its relationship with the intermarket price difference. 
Total open interest at Chicago (X8) had a negative relationship 
with the intermarket price differential in three crop years and was 
positive three years. This was the only variable that did not meet 
the minimum requirements for inclusion in the aggregate equation. 
Over the entire study period the largest observed price differ-
entials were Kansas City 12.25 cents per bushel over Chicago and Chicago 
24.25 cents per bushel over Kansas City. Thus the maximum observed 
range of the price differential was 36.5 cents per bushel. 
Table IV and Table V in the appendix present equations that esti-
mated linear trends for the Gulf price of wheat and the intermarket 
price difference respectively. It is evident that the signs on the 
slope coefficients of estimated equations on both of these data series 
were the same in six of the ntne crop years studied. Thus in 66 per-
cent of the years covered in this study, if the Gulf price tended to 
trend upward during the crop year so did the intermarket price differ-
ence. When the Gulf price of wheat was going up, the Chicago futures 
quote tended to increase at a faster rate than Kansas City. When the 
Gulf price of wheat was trending downward, the Chicago futures price 
tended to go down at a faster rate than Kansas City. These results 
were not expected. 
The hedging 10ad at Kansas City was heavily unbalanced to the 
short side during most of the period covered by this study. Reported 
hedging at Kansas City was, on the average, net short 9.4 million 
bushels per observation (nearly 1900 contracts) in the 1969 crop year 
and 18.4 million bushels (nearly 3700 contracts) in the 1967 crop year. 
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This is, of course, more unmatched hedging than could be matched easily 
by speculation at Kansas City. In the 1970 crop year the situation of 
net short hedging eased slightly. Then in the 1971 through 1973 crop 
years the average net hedging became much more manageable and even 
net long by 2.3 million bushels in one year, 1973. 
The effects of the unbalanced hedging load at Kansas City are 
noticeable in the crop-year equations. In the 1965 through 1969 crop 
years long hedging at Kansas City (X 5) was included in every equation 
and the short hedging ratio (X 6) was included in all but 1968. In 
the following four crop years x5 was included only once and x6 twice. 
Implications 
This study offers information concerning the effects of selected 
variables on the intermarket price differentials. However in an effort 
to offer greater assistance to wheat producers and marketing firms in 
selecting the most advantageous market to use for hedging wheat the 
following general guidelines are presented. The guidelines are based 
on findings of this study. No general guideline can be used to make a 
correct decision in every specific instance. The problem is much more 
complex than that. These general guidelines however, should offer 
assistance by serving as a starting point in the hedge placement deci-
sion. 
As a reference point from which to begin this analysis recall 
that in six of the nine crop-year equations if the Gulf wheat price 
series showed a positive trend the Chicago price of wheat increased 
relative to Kansas City. If the Gulf price of wheat showed a nega-
tive trend the opposite was true. Therefore some expectation is needed 
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concerning the trend of the cash price of wheat at the Gulf over a 
crop year. Several sources of this type information are available 
including University· Extension personnel, commodity brokers and others. 
It is important at all times to be aware of the actual price 
differential. Obviously if the differential were near either of the 
maximum differentials the difficulty of the decision could be dimin-
ished. However, it would not be impossible for the intermarket price 
difference to exceed the 11 limits 11 found during the present study. 
The next step would be to arrive at some expectation for exports. 
If exports were expected to be larger than last year, Chicago would be 
expected to gain on Kansas City. If the inverse were true Kansas City 
should gain on Chicago. 
The final two factors considered here would be expectations 
concerning the Gulf basis and the wheat-corn ratio at the Gulf. These 
two factors will tend to represent positive and negative relationships 
respectively with the intermarket price difference. However in periods 
of heavy exports, relative to the recent past, both these relationships 
change. Assuming a period of relatively 11 normal 11 exports, an increase 
in the Gulf basis would suggest that Chicago will gain relati~ely on 
Kansas City. This variable would not be easy to project. Therefore 
a better method would be to simply keep track of the movements ~f the 
Gulf basis and try to notice trends as they occur. 
The whea,t-corn price ratio is also difficult to predict. However 
some information can be obtained from the simple statistics associated 
with the variable. The mean of the series over the entire period was 
about l .3. The maximum value was around 2.0 and the minimum about l .0. 
This ratio is affected by supply and demand conditions for the two grains. 
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An example of market selection for hedging might be similar to 
the following. If the Gulf price of wheat is expected to trend down-
ward over the next crop year, producers whould be extremely interested 
in hedging their wheat crop. For reasons mentioned earlier, the Chicago 
futures quote could be expected to decline relative to Kansas City. Thus 
a short hedge should be placed in the Chicago market. However several 
other factors should be analyzed. The present intermarket price 
differential is one. If it is within a "normal" range then the next 
variable to look at is estimated exports of grain relative to last 
year. If the estimate represents a decrease from last year then this 
study would reinforce the decision to use the Chicago market for place-
ment of the short hedge. 
The Gulf basis and the wheat-corn ratio can also be used to shore 
up the decision or possibly cast doubt on it. If wheat prices were 
high relative to corn and expectations were for the ratio to decline, 
this would suggest the use of Kansas City rather than Chicago for the 
short hedge. In contrast, an expected decline in the Gulf basis would 
mean that the Chicago futures might be used most effectively in the 
short hedge. The opposite markets would have been selected in the 
above example for placing a long hedge. 
Of utmost importance is the fact that for all the variables to 
indicate the use of the same market at any one time could be a rare 
occurrence. The information available must be analyzed and hedge 
placements made after careful thought and analysis. 
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Suggestions for Further Research 
Due to the date this study was undertaken, no years were analyzed 
in which the government controlled virtually no stocks of wheat and 
only two years of data were available for the period of increased 
export demand. Currently more information is available, thus making 
possible the analysis of a larger group of years that could be charac-
terized by large export levels (relatives to the pre 1970 1 s) and low 
levels of governmentally controlled stocks. In the analysis, predic-
tive equations should be estimated and the results tested in an effort 
to see how well the established criteria predicted the correct market 
with which to place the hedge. 
Current research is needed to help explain and predict the move-
ment of the basis (difference in cash and futures price). Hedgers 
of inventories are constantly aware of the basis and its movements. 
When inventories are hedged, the risk of a price change is greatly 
reduced but the basis risk remains. Research that would offer insight 
into the factors affecting the basis would be quite helpful. Potential 
hedgers with more complete information concerning the cash futures 
relationships could make better decisions concerning hedge placement. 
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STATISTICAL REr,RESSION COEFFICIENTS ASSOCIATED WITH 
THE TREND IN THE WEEKLY GULF PRICE OF WHEAT, 
CROP YEARS 1965-66 THROUr,H 1973-74 
· Average 
r,ulf Price Intercept Time 
184.902 169.692 0.585 
(8.95) 
198.667 213.271 -0.562 
( 10. 38) 
171 . 333 182.103 -0.376 
(5.83) 
152.627 155. 955 0 .128 
(3.04) 
154 .860 152.674 0.086 
( 1 . 63) 
171 . 780 169. 271 0.098 
(2.19) 
173.020 171.563 0.056 
(0.95) 
264.627 218.891 1. 759 
(10.62) 























TABLE V , 
STATISTICAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS ASSOCIATED WITH 
THE TREND IN THE WEEKLY CHICAGO-KANSAS CITY 
JULY WHEAT FUTURES PRICE DIFFERENTIAL, 
CROP YEARS 1965-66 THROUGH 1973-74 
Average Price 
Differential Intercept Time 
2 .091 6.094 -0. 154 
(5.34) 
-2.858 1 .340 -0.161 
(15.02) 
-1 .860 2.935 -0.184 
( 12. 60) 
-1 . 551 -3.669 0.081 
(4.31) 
4. 517 1 .248 0 .128 
(10.62) 
7.960 6.237 0.068 
( 4. 37) 
1 .426 3.626 -0.085 
(4.16) 
8.245 -3.810 0.464 
(15.40) 
-2 .. 578 -0.027 -0.098 















Mean 2 .091 
Std. Dev. 3.774 
Mean -2.858 
Std. Dev. 2.648 
Mean -1 .860 
Std. Dev. 3. 136 
Mean - l . 551 
Std. Dev. 2.310 
Mean 4.517 
Std. Dev. 2.232 
TABLE VI 
SIMPLE STATISTICS FOR DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, 
CROP YEARS 1965-66 THROUGH 1973-74 
Variables* 
xl X2 X3 X4 X5 x6 X7 
Price Short 
Gulf Gulf Ratio Long Hedging Net 
Price Ex~rts Basis W/C Hedging Ratio Spreading 
1965-66 (n=51) 
184. 902 15.338 27.978 l .318 12.786 0.712 -1. 560 
11. 040 3.493 3.559 0.062 2.703 0.058 0.762 
1966-67 ( n=51) 
198.667 12. 733 24.402 1. 320 13.010 0.824 -3.318 
10.073 3.690 3.663 0.035 2.737 0.044 l. 562 
1967-68 (n=51) 
172. 333 13. 230 21.037 l. 376 21.959 0.795 -2.960 
8. 728 3.613 5 .110 0.061 4.070 0.090 0.990 
1968-69 ( n=5l ) 
152.627 8.962 18.686 l. 220 14.869 0.831 -2.247 
4. 771 4.124 3.549 0. 105 5.262 0.053 1. 467 
1969-70 (n=51) 
154. 860 10. 298 22.222 1 . 129 15. 087 0.865 -0.250 





125. 593 -13.808 
23.698 5.131 
166.288 -1 .398 
12.340 7.248 
179.187 -0.517 
51 . 600 7.624 
168. 902 -4.465 
49.331 -6.416 
97.070 -6. 132 


































TABLE VI (Continued) 
Variables* 
X2 X3 X4 X5 x6 X7 "8 X9 
Pnce Short Chicago Chicago 
Gulf Ratio Long Hedging Net Open Net 





































































*Gulf Price = Gulf price of wheat, Exports =Wheat inspections for export, Gulf Basis = Gulf price of wheat less the July Kansas 
City futures close on the same day, Price Ratio W/C =Gulf price of wheat divided by the Gulf price of corn, Long Hedging= Long 
reported hedging at Kansas City, Short Hedging Ratio = Short reported hedging at Kansas City divided by total open interest, Net 
Spreading = Short less long reported spreading at Kansas City, Chicago Open Interest = Total open interest at Chicago, Chicago Net 
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